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Abstract 
Philosophers and historians of biology have argued that genes are conceptualized 
differently in different fields of biology and that these differences influence both the 
conduct of research and the interpretation of research by audiences outside the field in 
which the research was conducted. In this paper we report the results of a questionnaire 
study of how genes are conceptualized by biological scientists at the University of 
Sydney, Australia. The results provide tentative support for some hypotheses about 
conceptual differences between different fields of biological
                                         
1 To appear in Studies in History and Philosophy of  Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 
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How Biologists Conceptualize Genes: An empirical study 
1. Introduction 
The philosophy of biology is concerned with those biological debates in which 
conceptual and empirical issues are so entangled that progress demands both scientific 
knowledge and the tools of philosophical analysis (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999: 5-7). The 
contested and multi-faceted concept of the gene is at the heart of many of these debates. 
The study of the gene concept, however, poses a challenge to the traditional philosophical 
practice of conceptual analysis. Traditionally, philosophers have relied on their individual 
linguistic competence with the corresponding words. When analyzing a concept, the 
philosopher treats him or herself as a sociolinguistic 'sample of one'. This approach can 
be extended to technical concepts, since any philosopher of biology should be in a 
position to consult his or her intuitions as a biologically literate sample of one (Neander 
1991). But much of the philosophical literature emphasizes the diversity of 
conceptualizations of the gene, either over time or between different fields. A sample of 
one is manifestly not going to reveal the ways in which biologist’s ideas about the gene 
differ on the basis of differences in theory, training, experience or r sear h focus.  
 
The philosophical perspective that informs the design of this study is one in which 
scientific categories are conceived as ongoing - a d possibly ramifying - projects of 
deriving empirical generalizations of increasing scope and reliability by adjusting both 
the extension of those categories, so as to encompass sets of instances with as much in 
common as possible, and the intension of those categories, so that statements involving 
the category change their modal status in a way that reflects the centrality of those 
statements to current theory (Griffiths 1999). In addition, conceptual change is driven by 
pragmatic and normative projects that employ the same categories (Hacking 1991; 
Griffiths In Press, 2004). This philosophical perspective is congruent with the so-called 
‘theory view of concepts’ in contemporary psychology, according to which a concept is a 
node in a network of beliefs about the cognitive domain in which its object lies (Medin 
1989). The perspective also resonates with Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s discussion of the 
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gene as an ‘epistemic objects’ in molecular biology – an entity whose name is introduced 
as a target of research rather than to designate something with which researchers are 
acquainted (Rheinberger 1997, 2000)i.  A scientist’s grasp of an epistemic object is 
constituted by the set of experimental practices through which they seek to establish facts 
about it. Hence differences in the experimental practices used by particular scientists will 
be reflected in differences in how they apply the concept and in their modal intuitions 
about the epistemic object. 
 
From this perspective, the conceptual analyst has no alternative but to examine what 
different biologists say and do. There are a number of ways to achieve this. One is via the 
history of science, an approach which is extremely valuabl  and which forms part of the 
background to this study. Another is by comparing published work from several different 
scientific fields. Authors in contemporary philosophy of genetics do this, as well as 
talking to biologists with whom they collaborate. Cur ent debate in the philosophy of 
genetics is thus biologically well-informed and a fertile source of hypotheses and 
suggestive arguments about the gene concept, its varieties and their uses. However, no 
individual can be equally well acquainted with the hole spectrum of contemporary 
biological research. It is also plausible that the biologists who choose to collaborate with 
philosophers or to participate in philosophical debates are unrepresentative on the 
biological community as a whole. Our aim in this study was to evaluate some of the 
competing accounts of the gene concept in a more rigorous and systematic way. We 
hoped to avoid the inevitable biases that come from having worked in one particular 
biological field before becoming a philosopher, from collab rating with some particular 
research group or simply from having a particular interest in one or more fields of 
research. Although this can only be regarded as a preliminary study, it suggests that a 
more systematic and quantitative approach to this nd other conceptual issues in the 
philosophy of biology is both feasible and rewarding. 
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2. Recent Work on the Concept of the Gene  
The founders of classical Mendelian genetics were divided as to whether the gene was 
primarily a postulated explanatory entity or an instrumental device by which to express 
regularities in the transmission of phenotypic characters (Falk 1986). Rafael Falk argues 
that this led to a productive dialectic in which discoveries about the chemical nature of 
the gene alternated with new functional definitions of the gene at progressively deeper 
levels of chemical analysis. The initial Mendelian postulate of a close correspondence 
between gene and trait was replaced by a postulated one-to-one correspondence between 
gene and enzyme. This in turn was replaced by a one-to-one correspondence between 
genes and elements of proteins. The 'classical molecular gene concept'ii, which emerged 
in the 1950s and retains considerable currency today, identifies a gene with a stretch of 
DNA that codes for one of the polypeptide chains that goes to make up a functional 
protein. This dialectical development of the gene concept can be interpreted as reflecting 
a desire to keep the structural and functional definitions of the gene focused on a single 
entity. When the best structural definition turns out to create units with indeterminate 
function, structure and function can be brought back into step by using a more proximal 
description of function: rather than a gene having an indeterminate effect on the 
phenotype, it has a determinate effect on one of the structural elements that contributes to 
the phenotype ((Griffiths and Neumann-Held 1999), see also (Kitcher 1982)). 
 
The classical molecular gene concept, however, was only a temporary resting point. An 
initial difficulty with the classical molecular conception is that the actual activity of the 
gene, and hence its developmental effect, depends on elements outside the transcription 
unit. This has led to definitions of the gene, which include the promoter and regulatory 
sequences that affect whether the gene will be transcribed.  In a case like the famous lac 
operon in E. coli, these sites are immediately upstream of the site at which transcription is 
initiated and it is easy to regard them as parts of the gene. In eukaryotes, however, 
regulatory regions can be distant from the rest of the gene and can be involved in the 
regulation of more than one gene. It is perhaps unproblematic to regard regulatory 
regions that are not transcribed into RNA as neither genes themselves nor parts of any 
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other specific gene, although this is certainly a departure from the classical Mend lian 
conception of a gene as a segment of chromosome, different allelic forms of which can be 
tracked via their differing effects on the phenotype. It is less easy to treat actual coding 
sequences in this way. The one-to-  correspondence between stretche  of coding DNA 
and genes is challenged by the existence of overlapping genes, which share some of the 
same sequence. Here we see the very same DNA treated as (part of) two different genes 
because those genes produce different gene products. But there must be additional 
reasons why these cases are treated in this way, since the ubiquitous existence of introns 
in eukaryote genes allows several gene products to be made from a single gene by cutting 
and splicing the primary mRNA transcript in alternative ways. On  response to introns is 
to use the abovementioned strategy of retaining a unitary function for each gene by 
moving the function closer to the DNA itself. If a gene is defined as the stretch of DNA 
coding for a single primary mRNA transcript, rather than a single polypeptide, then a 
gene can still be defined by a single gene product. Another alternative is to abstract away 
from the details of the various spliced transcripts to obtain a single feature to associate 
with gene from which they are all transcribed. For example, it has been pointed out that 
the whole family of transcripts preserves the linear order of codons, omitting different 
ones but never inserting reversing the order or inserting additional codons (Epp 1997). 
However, the phenomenon of mRNA editing, in which individual bases that do not 
correspond to bases in the DNA are inserted into the mRNA transcript, means that not all 
‘gene products’ have even this abstract relationship to the DNA from which they 
originate. Another class of problems for the classical molecular gene conception arises 
because of transplicing, the phenomenon in which mRNA transcripts from several 
different loci are brought together and spliced into a single mRNA before being 
translated into a single ‘gene product’. Cases involving transplicing can be treated as a 
single gene split between more than one loci, as a process for deriving a single product 
from more than one genes, or, where one transpliced element is somehow subordinate to 
the other, as an instance of a single gene with a distant, transcribed regulatory region 
(Fogle 2001). 
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One response to the variety of structural and functional units that can be usefully defined 
in contemporary molecular genetics is pluralism. Falk writes: "Today the gene is not the 
material unit or the instrumental unit of inheritance, but rather a uni , a segment that 
corresponds to a unit-function as defined by the individual experimentalist's needs" (Falk
1986, 169) see also (Falk 2000, 2001). Such pluralism is not necessarily a c ticism of the 
current state of affairs. Falk is unsure if the current ambiguities of the gene concept will 
prove as helpful as earlier ambiguities. Kenneth Waters takes a still more positive view. 
Focusing on the problem that many products can be derived from the same sequence, he 
sees different definitions of the gene as unified by a ‘fundamental gene concept’, namely, 
"a gene for a linear sequence in a product at some stage of genetic expression”(Waters 
1994, 178) see also (Waters 2000). Whether introns are part of a gene depends on which 
particular “linear sequence in a product at some stage of gene ic xpression” scientists are 
referring to (Waters 1994, 179). The ‘fundamental concept’ plus the scientist's research 
focus determines which DNA elements constitute the gene. Thomas Fogle is a less 
sanguine pluralist, arguing that current usage of the term ‘gene’ is driven by a 
historically-derived stereotype. This stereotype is based on f cts about the structure and 
function of protein coding genes that take the form of a continuous series of DNA bases. 
More problematic DNA elements, with diverse functions and structures are called genes 
if they resemble the stereotype sufficiently. Sets of DNA elements that are discovered to 
underlie some function in the cell are divided into one or more genes and various 
auxiliary elements in order to facilitate seeing them via this stereotype (Fogle 2001).  
 
While Waters has looked for unity in the diversity of the gene concept, Lenny Moss has 
recently argued that one particular aspect of conceptual diversity is the key to 
understanding both the scientific utility of the gene concept and some of its pitfalls. 
According to Moss, both current and historic conceptualizations of the gene make use of 
two different ways of classifying DNA sequences, taxonomic schemes that he labels 
Gene-P and Gene-D: 
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"Gene-P is the expression of a kind of instrumental preformationism (…). When 
one speaks of a gene in the sense of Gene-P o  simply speaks s ifit causes the 
phenotype. A gene for blue eyes is a Gene-P. What makes it count as a gene for 
blue eyes is not any definite molecular sequence (after all it is the absence of a 
sequence based resource that matters here) nor any knowledge of the 
developmental pathway that leads to blue eyes (to which the "gene for blue eyes" 
makes a negligible contribution at most), but only the ability to track the 
transmission of this gene as a predictor of blue eyes. Th s far Gene-P sounds 
purely classical, that is, Mendelian as opposed to molecular. But a molecular 
entity can be treated as a Gene-P as well. BRCA1, the gene for breast cancer, is a 
Gene-P, as is the gene for cystic fibrosis, even though in both cases phenotypic 
probabilities based upon pedigrees have become supplanted by probabilities based 
upon molecular probes.   
… 
Quite unlike Gene-P, Gene-D is defined by its molecular sequence. A Gene-D is a 
developmental resource (…) which in itself is ind terminate with respect to 
phenotype (…). To be a gene for N-CAM, the so-called "neural cell adhesion 
molecule," for example, is to contain the specific nucleic acid sequences from 
which any of 100 potentially different isoforms of the N-CAM protein may 
ultimately be derived… N-CAM molecules are (despite the name) expressed at 
many tissues, at different developmental stages, and in many different forms. The 
phenotypes of which N-CAM molecules are co-constitutive are thus highly 
variable, contingent upon the larger context, and not germane to the status N-
CAM as a Gene-D. So where a Gene-P is defined strictly on the basis of its 
instrumental utility in predicting a phenotypic outcome and is most often based 
upon the absence of some normal sequence, a Gene-D is a specific developmental 
resource, defined by its specific molecular sequence and thereby functional 
template capacity and yet it is indeterminate with respect to ultimate phenotypic 
outcomes.” (Moss 2001, 87- 8, his italics)  
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Moss's work falls into a 'developmentalist' tradition of criticism of overly simple 
conceptions of the role of genes in the construction of phenotypes (Oyama, Griffiths, and 
Gray 2001). Developmentalists have often directed their criticisms at 'implicit 
preformationism' — the idea that phenotypic outcomes are preformed in a genetic cause 
as ‘traitunculi’ (Schaffner 1998) rather than emerging epigenetically through the 
interaction of this and other causes. Moss clarifies this criticism by arguing that the 
'preformationism' embodied in the Gene-P conc ption is both a productive research 
strategy in its own epistemological sphere and the source of oversimplified and unhelpful 
ideas about the role of genes in development. It is a productive research strategy bec use 
genes really are statistical predictors of phenotypic outcomes. But sequences that are 
identified as Gene-Ps immediately become a legitimate focus of interest as Gene-Ds. If 
the presence of a sequence is correlated with an outcome it is sensible to ask how that 
sequence contributes to development. This double-life of the gene concept and of 
individual (token) DNA sequences makes it easy to misunderstand claims made about 
Gene-Ps and to hear them as if they were about Gene-Ds. Genes are conceptualized in 
terms of their contextual effects (Gene-P) and then treated as developmental causes under 
that conceptualization, rather than the Gene-D conceptualization appropriate for thinking 
about developmental questions. In this way, the effect that a Gene-D has on a phenotype 
in a particular developmental context comes to be treated as an intrinsic property of that 
Gene-D and as an inevitable consequence of its presence in an organism.  
 
The most popular notion of the gene in the wider community is undoubtedl  the 
informational conception: a gene is a packet of developmental information, or an 
instruction for development. Like many other philosophers, we would argue that the 
notion of information deployed in this conception of the gene “is little more than a 
metaphor that masquerades as a theoretical concept and ...leads to a misleading picture of 
possible explanations in molecular biology” (Sarkar 1996, 187). Developmental 
information is not stored in the literal genetic code, because the formal coding relation 
between DNA and polypeptides specifies only the primary structure of proteins 
(Godfrey-Smith 1999; Griffiths 2001). The other informational and cybernetic locutions 
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used in molecular biology are equally applicable to genetic and non-g netic factors in 
development, and if taken seriously, require a recognition of the fact that the 
developmental significance of a causal factor is a function of its developmental context 
((Griffiths and Knight 1998; Griffiths 2001) but see (Maynard Smith 2000) for a contrary 
view). The loose notion of the gene as a unit of developmental information does little 
harm when the focus of research is actual molecular gene products and their interactio s
and when Gene-P notions are being applied to that level of gene expression. At that level 
of analysis there are tight connections between what genes do (Gene-P) an  their intrinsic 
molecular nature (Gene-D). Furthermore, contextual factors affecting whe her genes are 
transcribed, what products are derived from them and what those products go on to do are 
the actual focus of research and unlikely to be systematically overlooked. When the focus 
is on higher levels of biological organization, however, and particularly when results are 
reported to the wider community, loose information talk almost inevitable leads to the 
conflation of Gene-P and Gene-D and the resultant misinterpretation discussed above 
(Moss 2002; Griffiths In Press). 
 
For most purposes, evolutionary biologists work with something like the Gene-P 
conception. Their interest is in the relationship between changing gene frequencies in 
populations over time and changes in the phenotypes manifested by the individuals that 
make up those populations. The gene-P conc ption embodies the relevant kind of 
statistical relationships. The term 'evolutionary gene concept', however, is normally 
attached to a very different idea introduced by George C. Williams (Williams 1966)and 
elaborated by Richard Dawkins: “Any stretch of DNA, beginning and ending at 
arbitrarily chosen points on the chromosome, can be considered to be competing with 
allelomorphic stretches for the region of chromosome concerned” (Dawkins 1982, 87). 
The purpose of the evolutionary gene concept is to abstract away from the complexities 
of the gene-phenotype relationship. The inheritance of DNA sequences is assum d to 
underlie all heritable phenomena of interest to evolution. Change over time in the DNA 
sequence can be exhaustively described using the formalism of population genetics and 
the evolutionary gene concept. That takes care of the molecular level, leaving the 
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evolutionary biologist free to study the evolution of phenotypic characters using the 
formalism of population genetics without worrying about the relationship between 
molecular genes and these phenotypic characters. However, as many critics r pidly 
pointed out, the ability to describe changes in the composition of the genome after the 
fact is not the same as the ability to explain or predict those changes. Kim Sterelny and 
Griffiths conclude that in his responses to these critics Dawkins effectively abandoned 
the evolutionary gene concept (St relny and Griffiths 1999, 79-82). The definition of the 
gene with which he replaced it with is an amalgam of Gene-P and -D and has no 
particular currency in the biological community in its own right, so we have not 
considered it in this study. Williams has also moved on from his 1966 definition and now 
supports a very radical version of the informational conception of the gene (Williams 
1992). 
 
On the basis of the literature reviewed above, we advanced three hypotheses: 
· Hypothesis One. We expected to see a strong divergence between molecular and 
evolutionary biologists, given the emphasis on the investigation of the intrinsic, 
structural nature of the gene in the former discipline and the emphasis on genes as 
markers of phenotypic effects in the latter discipline. In particular, we expected 
molecular biologists to be reluctant to identify a gene only by its contributions to 
relatively distant levels of gene expression. Conversely, we expected evolutionary 
biologists to be reluctant to treat two similar DNA sequences as the same gene 
when they lead to different outcomes for the larger system in which they are 
embedded. 
 
· Hypothesis Two. We also expected developmental biologists and evolutionary 
biologists to differ, with evolutionary biologists emphasizing the predictive 
relationship between genes a d phenotypes and developmental biologists 
emphasizing the intrinsic nature of the gene as a molecular object and contextual 
effects on gene expression. Consequently, we also expected stronger support for 
the informational conception of the gene from evolutionists. 
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· Hypothesis Three. We expected developmental biologists to be less attracted to 
Moss’s Gene-P and to the informational conception of the gene than (other) 
molecular biologists. We expected developmental biologists to be attracted to 
conceptions that emphasize contingency and context dependency, such as Moss’s 
Gene-D and various developmentally-oriented conceptions of the gene canvassed 
in the literature on evolutionary developmental biology. 
 
In addition to these specific hypotheses, we saw this as n exploratory study and were 
interested in what the responses suggest about the general state of the gene concept in 
contemporary biology. We also examined the effects of age and gender. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Subject Recruitment 
Subjects were post-PhD biological scientists making use of molecular techniques, and 
hence of the gene concept, in their research. To find these subjects we accessed a newly 
installed network of genomics and bioinformatics researchers at the University of Sydney 
from a wide array of departments, research groups, and institutes. We supplemented this 
list by examining the websites of the academic units in which list members were located. 
This produced a list of 250 potential subjects from biology, biochemistry, agriculture, 
veterinary science, medicine, pharmacology and chemistry. These scientists were sent a 
questionnaire, along with a covering letter explaining in general terms the aim of the 
study. From this mail-out we received some 80 correctly completed responses, a 
reasonable response rate given that we had no prior contact with recipients. 
3.2. Questionnaire Design  
The questionnaire had three sections, the first part designed to determine the subject’s 
research field, the second asking them direct questions about the gene concept and th  
third asking them to apply the gene concept to specific cases. The first section of the 
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questionnaire (Section A) gathered personal data on the professional training, research 
experience and current research field of subjects, along with age and gender (Table 1). 
 
The five questions in Section B of the questionnaire (Table 2) contained direct questions 
about the definition of the gene, the function of the gene and the methodological value of 
the gene concept. The answer alternatives for each question were designed to capture the 
various conceptions of the gene discussed in the literature. We used a number of different 
formulations of each conception to avoid superficial effects, such as antipathy to 
particular words or phrases. The actual wordings of ma y of the answer alternatives were 
copied, or lightly adapted, from the literature and from genomics websites, so as to avoid 
that we have misrepresented the relevant ideas, or attempted to influence responses 
through biased formulationsiii. Each question had an ‘Other’ alternative in which subjects 
could supply their own answer, but no useful data was obtained by this means. 
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1. Current Disciplinary Location 
a. Medicine 
I. Molecular Medicine 
II. Oncology 
III. Biochemistry 
IV. Pharmacology 
V. Infectious Diseases 
b. Biochemistry 
I. Molecular 
II. Cell  
III. Protein 
IV. Metabolism 
c. Biological Sciences 
I. Genetics 
II. Development  
III. Evolution, Taxonomy 
IV. Ecology 
V. Microbiology 
d. Agriculture 
I. Agricultural Genetics  
II. Animal Genetics 
III. Animal Science 
IV. Plant Breeding 
e. Veterinary Science 
f. Pharmacology 
g. Other 
2. Area of Training 
a. Medicine 
I. Molecular Medicine 
II. Oncology 
III. Biochemistry 
IV. Pharmacology 
V. Infectious Diseases 
b. Biochemistry 
I. Molecular 
II. Cell 
III. Protein 
IV. Metabolism 
c. Biological Sciences 
I. Genetics 
II. Development  
III. Evolution, Taxonomy 
IV. Ecology 
V. Microbiology 
d. Agriculture 
I. Agricultural Genetics 
II. Animal Genetics 
III. Animal Science 
IV. Plant Breeding 
e. Veterinary Science 
f. Pharmacology 
g. Other 
3. Disciplines of Degree 
Undergraduate degree in 
Postgraduate degree other than PhD in 
PhD defended in 
 
 
4.a. Gender  b. Age 
1. female  1. 20-34 
2.  male  2. 35-49 
   3. 50-70 
 
 
Table 1: Section A of the questionnaire. Used to group subjects by field, age and gender. Multiple 
selections were allowed. 
 
This section of the questionnaire contained both ‘free choice’ and ‘forced choice’ tasks. 
The former required subjects to indicate for each question all the answer alternatives to 
which they could agree. The latter required subjects to choose the single best answer 
amongst the alternatives offered. The free choice task was designed to recognize that 
individual subjects ould conceptualize genes in more than one way. The forced choice 
task aimed at revealing some of the subjects’ preferences and helped to increase variance 
when the free choice responses failed to exhibit significant differences between the 
subject groups. 
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Section C of the questionnaire (Table 4) was based on the design of an informal study 
conducted by Rob C. Knight in New Zealand with 10 respondents. This section used 
‘indirect’ questions, asking subjects to apply their conception of the gene, rather thanto 
answer questions about it. Subjects were given twenty-two examples of specific ways in 
which two DNA sequences could differ from one another and asked whether, in each 
case, these DNA sequences were two copies of the same gene.  
3.3. Defining Groups 
All three hypotheses assume the existence of more or less clearly identifiable groups of 
biologists that differ significantly in their views about genes. Using responses to Section 
A of the questionnaire (Table 1) we defined the three groups of biologists that appear in 
our hypotheses — ‘molecular’, ‘developmental’, and ‘evolutionary.’ A fourth group of 
'whole organism biologists' failed to show any significant differences and is not further 
discussed. Our operational definitions of molecular, developmental, and evolu ionary 
biologists were Boolean combinations of answers to questions in Section A, based on our 
intuition about the kind of scientist one can expect to find in certain (sub-) discipl es, 
departments, and research fieldsiv.  Essentially, anyone whocrossed ‘developmental 
biology’ either as area of training or PhD or disciplinary location/current research was 
classified as a member of the ‘developmental’ group, and the ‘molecular’ group had the 
majority of their training and work in biochemistry or molecular biology, while an 
‘evolutionist’ needed to tick evolution or taxonomy or ecology as either current location 
or training. Predictably, these definitions created overlapping groups. Because we were 
concerned to maintain an adequate number of subjects, those in the intersection of two 
groups were examined on an individual basis and assigned to a single group by a 
subjective assessment of their overall pattern of responses to Section A. This process was 
completed before examining Sections B and C of the questionnaire in order to keep group 
membership independent of subject’s views on the gene concept.  
3.4. Data Analysis 
The sample sizes of some of our groups (notably ‘evolutionary’) were small. This does 
not invalidate the results reported below, since the statistical measures utilized are 
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suitable for small sample sizes and unequal group sizes. This notwithstanding, results 
based on such small sample sizes must be taken as suggestive rather than definitive, and 
as a basis for further studies. 
 
For our analysis we used tests suitable for categorical data, which are all based on 
crosstabulation. We used the chi-square for determining the pres nce of an association 
between our independent variables (kinds of biologists) and dependent variables 
(different conceptions of the gene). Our measure of strength of association in many of 
our free choice cases (which can be represented by a two-way con ingency table) was the 
phi coefficient. In such symmetric cases and a high enough sample size it mimics the 
correlation coefficient by having a maximum value of 1 (perfect correlation) and a 
minimum value of 0 (no association), and Phi can be interpreted as a symmetric version 
of percent difference.  
 
Many of our contingency tables, however, involved variables with more than two values, 
(e.g. the forced choice tasks), and small sample sizes. In these cases Phi can be infinitely 
larger than 1 (which does not lend itself to an easy interpretation of the test in terms of 
the strength of association), and we preferred anothe statistical test designed for groups 
of unequal size and small sample sizes, Cramer’s V, which gives good norming from 0 to 
1 regardless of table and sample size. It is worth noting that as symmetrical measures Phi 
as well as Cramer’s V tend to understate asymmetric relationships between the 
independent and dependent variable. Also, the more unequal the marginals, the more V 
will understate an association. 
 
With respect to the significance of the results we have followed convention by dividing 
our results into those significant at the 0.05 (5%) and those at the 0.1 (10%) level, and 
reported other associations as not significant (ns). Failure to achieve the desired level of 
significance (5%) may often reflect the lack of power in this study due to small sample 
sizes. For the same reason, the absenceof an association in the results tables below does 
not provide good evidence that those variables are independent of one another.  
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4. Results 
4.1. The current state of the gene concept 
The responses suggest that the classical molecular gene concept continues to act as an 
important point of departure for biologists in conceptualizing the gene. When subjects 
were asked to indicate the biological function of a gene, the answer alternative 
corresponding to the classical molecular conceptualization was overwhelmingly the most 
popular: 2.3. Coding for the primary structure of a protein (free choice 92%, forced 
choice 63%) (Italicized phrases are drawn from the questionnaire. See Table 2 for a full 
list of questions and aswers). Similarly, when subjects were asked to choose between a 
series of sentence-length definitions of the gene, the answer alternative corresponding to 
the classical molecular conceptualization was the second most popular: 5.2. A stretch of 
DNA sequence that codes for a particular protein and that has a particular function (free 
choice 89%, forced choice 24%). This is the definition offered by the (Australian) 
National Human Genome Research Institute website, so the high level of agreement is 
perhaps unsurprising. However, the most popular answer to this question was a very 
broad, Mendelian (or even pre-Mendelian!) definition: 5.1. The functional and physical 
unit of heredity passed from parent to offspring (free choice 89%, forced choice 43%). 
The significance of this finding is explained in the next section.  
 
Amongst a set of shorter phrases purporting to sum up what a gene is, an alternative in 
the spirit of the classical molecular gene concept was again the second most popular 
choice: 1.4. Nucleic acid sequence with a certain characteristic function (free choice 
79%, forced choice 35%). The most popular of these short phrases, however, was 1.5 
Carrier of heritable information (free choice 87%, forced choice 44%). So, at least as a 
shorthand, the informational conception of the gene has currency amongst working 
biologists.  
 
In response to the more demanding question, “What is the methodological value of the 
gene concept?” the most popular answer alternative was 4.3. Studying the biological role 
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of a particular gene, which involves locating it within the contexts in which it is 
biologically active, helps to elucidate the complex molecular pathways in which it is an 
interactant (free choice 77%, forced choice 36%). This suggests that the complexities of 
genetic causation are salient facts for working biologists. 
4.2. Age and Gender Results 
Subjects were divided into three age groups: 20-34, 35-49 and 50-70 and into male and 
female.  Several answers were correlated with gender, but all these associations 
disappeared when the association between age and gender was taken into account. 
Female subjects were on average much younger than male subjects. The 20-34 age group 
contained 33.3% of the female subjects, but only 14% of the male subjects; the 35-49 age 
group contained 54.2% of females and 40.4% of males; the 50-70 age group contained 
only 10.3% of females, but 45.6% of males.  
 
When asked about the methodological value of the gene concept, older subjects favored 
two strikingly pluralistic, deflationary statemen s: 4.5. ‘Gene’ functions to remind 
modern geneticists of what it is that make a region of nucleic acid ‘interesting’, or of 
what constitutes ‘meaningful structure’ in the genome and 4.7. A handy and versatile 
term whose meaning is determined by the context in which it is used. Ol er subjects were 
also more likely to accept a third statement that located the gene primarily in evolutionary 
biology (4.2. Central concept in evolution: allows i) shortcut definition of evolution as 
change in gene frequency and ii) a general conception of evolution as gene selection). In 
contrast, younger biologists overwhelmingly saw the gene as primarily an object of 
interest to molecular biology (answer 4.3., quoted above). Results are shown in Figure 1. 
 
We have already noted that when asked to choose between a series of sentence-length 
definitions of the gene subjects predominantly favored either the classical molecular gene 
concept in a formulation obtained from Australia’s National Human Genome Research 
Institute (5.2) or a very vague, Mendelian (or even pre-Mendelian!) definition of the gene 
as unit of heredity (5.1).  
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Figure 1. Age related result  for the forced choice task on Section B, Question 4. See Table 2 and text for 
details. Association 0.625, significance 0.01. 
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Figure 2. Age related results for the forced choice task on Section B, Question 4. See Table 2 and text for 
details. Association 0.590, significance 0.009. 
 
These two definitions turn out to be extremely strongly associated with age, younger 
subjects favoring the ‘molecular’ definition and older subjects the ‘(pre-) Mendelian’ 
definition (Figure 2). 
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The fact that older biologists are more inclined to assign the gene a role in evolutionary 
theory is probably an artifact of the fact that biologists with an evolutionary focus were 
concentrated in our oldest age group, which in turn results from the fact that departments 
with an evolutionary focus have been growing (if at all) much more slowly than 
departments with a molecular focus in the last few decades. The finding that older 
biologists take a more pluralistic view of the gene cannot be dismissed in the same way. 
Pluralism, we suspect, is a genuine function of age, which is perhaps to be expected, 
given the regularity with which cherished ideas about the gene have been overthrown in 
the last fifty years.  
 
4.3. Results for Hypothesis One 
Hypothesis one predicts a strong divergence between molecular and evolutionary 
biologists, given the emphasis on the investigation of the intrinsic, structural nature of the 
gene in the former discipline and the emphasis on genes as markers of phenotypic effects 
in the later discipline. In particular, we expected molecular biologists to be reluctant to 
identify a gene only by its contributions to relatively distant levels of ge e xpression. 
Conversely, we expected evolutionary biologists to be reluctant to treat two similar DNA 
sequences as the same gene when they lead to different outcomes for the larger system in 
which they are embedded. 
 
In the light of this hypothesis we mad  the following predictions for the free-c oic  task 
on Section B of the questionnaire (Table 2): 
· Question 1. The molecular group is more likely to accept a structural conception 
of the gene (answer alternative 1.3) than the evolutionary group. The evoluti nary 
group is more likely to accept the Gene-P option (1.1) than the molecular group. 
· Question 2. The molecular group is more likely to accept the classical molecular 
conception (2.3). The evolutionary group is more likely to accept the Gene-P 
variants 2.1 v 2.2.  
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1. In short: What is a gene? 
1. That which makes the difference between two phenotypes. 
2. Any Nucleic acid sequence whatsoever. 
3. Nucleic acid sequence with a certain characteristic structure. 
4. Nucleic acid sequence with a certain characteristic function. 
5. A carrier of heritable information. 
6. A resource for Development. 
2. What is the biological function of a gene? 
1. Causing a phenotypic outcome. 
2. Determining a phenotypic outcome. 
3. Coding for the primary structure of a protein. 
4. Providing a developmental resource, on a par with other (epigenetic and environmental) resources, for the 
construction of the organism.  
5. To channel and reinforce epigenetic propensities instead of specify incremental alterations in morphology. 
6. Releasing and biasing the expression of latent morphogenetic capacities. 
7. Mechanism to buffer the development of established and ecologically successful phenotypes against environmental 
perturbations and metabolic noise. 
8. Functional part of a program for development that is written in the sequence of nucleotide bas s.  
3. What makes two genes “homologous”? 
1. Both have derived from a common ancestral gene (they are orthologous). 
2. Both have an identical sequence of nucleotides. 
3. Both produce functionally equivalent molecular products. 
4. Both are situated at homologous sites on homologous chromosomes. 
5. Both are able to recombine with one another in practice. 
6. Both are able to recombine with one another in theory (physically compatible). 
7. Both have derived from a gene duplication (they are paralogous). 
4. What is the methodol gical value of the gene concept? 
1. A gene has instrumental utility in predicting a phenotypic outcome.  
2. Central concept in evolution: allows i) shortcut definition of evolution as change in gene frequency and ii) a general 
conception of evolution as gene sel ction. 
3. Studying the biological role of a particular gene, which involves locating it within the contexts in which it is 
biologically active, helps to elucidate the complex molecular pathways in which it is an interactant. 
4. A convenient entry point to functionally conserved multi-molecular modules as units of development, morphology, 
variation and innovation.  
5. ‘Gene’ functions to remind modern geneticists of what it is that make a region of nucleic acid ‘interesting’, or of 
what constitutes ‘meaningful structure’ in the genome. 
6. A gene draws our attention to a collection of useful functional domains (exons) which can be combined in different 
ways. 
7. A handy and versatile term whose meaning is determined by the context in which it is used. 
5. At length: What is a gene: 
1. The functional and physical unit of heredity passed from parent to offspring. 
2. A stretch of DNA sequence that codes for a particular protein that has a particular function. 
3. A package of information that contains and implements a particular instruction. 
4. A gene is defined by its relationship to a phenotype regardless of the specific molecular sequence and the whole 
developmental mechanisms involved.  
5. A developmental resource defined by its specific molecular sequence and functional template capacity but which is 
indeterminate with respect to the phenotypic outcomes to which it will contribute.  
6. A segment of chromosome. Some genes direct the synthesis of proteins, others have regulatory functions. 
7. A process that includes DNA sequences and other components, which participate in the time and tissue specific 
expression of a particular polypeptide product. 
8. Any stretch of DNA, beginning and ending at arbitrarily chosen points on the chromosome, that segregates and 
recombines with appreciable frequency. 
9. A functional unit and part of the processes that specify cellular and intercellular organization, defined by the action 
of a complex self-regulating system for which the inherited DNA provides the crucial raw material. 
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Table 2: Section B of the questionnaire. In the free choice task, subjects were asked to tick every acceptable 
answer alternative. In the forced choice task they were asked to choose the best alternative. The ‘Other’ 
alternative for each question has been omitted. 
 
(Because this was a free choice task, when more than one answer alternative 
seemed to express the same concepti n of the gene, we predicted a weak 
disjunction of these alternatives (either a or b or both) as the response for the 
relevant group). 
· Question 4. The evolutionary group is more likely to accept the Gene-P 
alternative 4.1 and the specifically evolution-oriented 4.2. The molecular group is 
more likely to accept 4.3 and 4.6, answers that emphasize the investigation of 
genes at the molecular level. 
· Question 5. Evolutionary biologists are more likely to accept the gene-P op ion 
5.4, whilst the molecular group are more likely to accept statements of the 
classical molecular conception (5.2 v 5.6) and the more complex answers relating 
genes to other processes at the molecular level (5.5 v 5.9). 
 
1.3 M 50%, E 50%, ns 1.1 E 0%, M 43%, ns  
2.3 M 100%, E 100%, ns 2.1v2 E 0%, M 71%, .458/.002 
4.3 M 77%, E 80%, ns 4.1 E 40%, M 72%, ns
4.6 M 39%, E 40%, ns 4.2 E 100%, M 46%, .342/.023 
5.2v6 M 95%, E 100%, ns 5.4 E 20%, M 10%, ns
5.5v9 M 55%, E 60%, ns 
 
  
 
Table 3: Test of hypothesis 1 with data from the free choice task. Left-hand column shows answer 
alternatives for which we predicted agreement by the molecular group (M), right-hand column those for 
which we predicted agreement by the evolutionary group (E). Result cells: the numbers behind the 
characters show percentage of yes answers among the respective group (M, E), the following fractions 
indicate strength (0 – 1) and significance (0 – 1)of association. Results marked ns were not significant 
(>10% or .100). Bold results indicate high significance (< 5% or .050), italic results show associations in 
the reverse direction to that predicted. 
 
The results for the free choice task were not consistent with hypothesis one. Rather than 
favoring the phenotype-focused Gene-P conception, the evolutionary group tended to 
reject it when it was offered explicitly (Table 3). Th forced choice results were similar, 
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and are not reported here for reasons of space (Complete results are available at 
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu). So the results from Section B, in which we asked direct 
questions, suggest that biologists with an evolutionary focus in their research do not 
conceptualize genes in terms of their phenotypic effects in any way that distinguishes 
them from biologists with a purely molecular research focus. A very different picture 
emerges, however, from responses to the indirect questions in Section C (Table 4).   
 
In the light of hypothesis one, we predicted that the molecular and evolutionary groups 
would respond differently to several items in Section C of the questionnaire (see Table 
4). Questions 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 present a series of cases in which th  proposed identity 
between two DNA sequences is based on their producing identical proximal gene 
products, whilst their more distal products, with more direct causal relevance to the 
phenotype, are increasingly allowed to diverge. We expected the molecular group to 
classify all these pairs as the same gene, because of their proximal similarity. Whilst both 
groups should agree that 6.4 represents two copies of the same gene, we expected the 
evolutionary group to reject the claim that the sequences in 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 are two 
copies of the same gene, because the distal products of the two sequences differ in ways 
that should lead to different phenotypic effects. Questions 6.9 and 6.10 also describe 
sequences which have the same nucleotide sequence but different molecular products, 
and so we expected the molecular group to treat these as the same gene and the 
evolutionary group to treat them as different genes. Conversely, 6.19 describes sequences 
that differ at the molecular level but have the same effect on the phenotype, a 
straightforward instance of same Gene-P, and we expected the evolutionary group to 
accept this as a case of the same gene and the molecular group to reject it.  
 
In contrast to the results for the direct questions in Section B, those for the indirect 
questions in Section C supported hypothesis one (Table 5). The pattern of answers to 
questions 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 shows the evolutionary group responding significantly more 
strongly to changes in distal function than the molecular group. Answers to 6.9 and 6.19 
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6.1  Any two identical nucleotide sequences, beginning and ending at arbitrary points, at equivalent loci on homologous 
chromosomes in different cells of the same organism. 
6.2  Two transcription units of identical nucleotide sequence at equivalent loci on homolog us chromosomes in 
different cells of the same organism.  
6.3  Two transcription units of identical nucleotide sequence on non-homologous chromosomes in the same organism.
6.4  Two transcription units of identical nucleotide sequence leading to the same func ional protein.  
6.5  Two transcription units of identical nucleotide sequence, which are translated into the same polypeptide chain, 
regardless of how it is folded. 
6.6  Two transcription units of identical nucleotide sequence, which produce the same final ranscript, regardless of 
what happens to this transcript.  
6.7  Two transcription units of identical nucleotide sequence, which produce the same primary transcript, regardless of 
what happens to this transcript. 
6.8  Two transcription units of identical nucleotide sequence which produce the same final transcript but contain 
different introns. 
6.9  Two transcription units of identical nucleotide sequence whose final transcript contains differently spliced exons. 
6.10 Two transcription units of identical nucleotide sequence, one of which has its exons scrambled in its final transcript 
(as happens in ciliates). 
6.11 Two transcription units of identical nucleotide sequence with different promoters but with identical levels of 
transcription.  
6.12 Two transcription units of identical nucleotide sequence with different promoters and different levels of 
transcription.  
6.13 Two transcription units which differ only in a single silent mutation.  
6.14 Two transcription units that differ in a number of silent mutations, not affecting the level of expression.  
6.15 Two transcription units that differ in a number of silent mutations, affecting the level of expression significantly. 
6.16 Two otherwise identical transcription units containing different nonsens  mutations both of which destroy the 
corresponding enzyme’s catalytic activity. 
6.17 Two transcription units, which differ so as to produce a single substitution in the amino acid sequence but with no 
observable developmental effect.  
6.18 Two transcription units with identical sequences but which produce different polypeptides due to differences in the 
genetic code (eg., between mitochondria and nuclei). 
6.19 Two allelic transcription units differing in sequence but with identical phenotypic effect. 
6.20 Two transcription units of identical nucleotide sequence, one of which is found on a free transposon and one of 
which is found in normal genomic DNA. 
6.21 Two identical nucleotide sequences, one is an active coding sequence, the other is split into two (non-funct onal) 
pieces by an insertion.  
6.22 Two transcription units of identical nucleotide sequence that have evolved independently in different taxa through 
convergent evolution.  
Table 4: Section C of the questionnaire. Subjects were asked whether each item described two copies of the 
same gene. Question 6.8 contained a typological error. 
 
differed in the predicted direction, although the difference was not statistically 
significant. However, the fact that in the direct questions the evolutionary group was less 
accepting of Gene-P conceptions than the molecular group and that this position is here 
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apparently reversed, leads us to take these insignificant results as at least somewhat 
suggestive. The striking difference between the results for Section B and Section C of the 
questionnaire lead us to advance a new hypothesis, namely that the evolutionary group 
has an explicit belief that genes are molecular entities and should be defined and 
investigated at that level, but that when asked to think about actual cases, they employ a 
Gene-P conception that abstracts away from differences at the molecular level and 
focuses on phenotypic effects. We hope to investigate this hypothesis in future research.
 
Answer predictions for Molecular Group  
6.5 M 66%, E 0%, .389/.006 6.6 M 66%, E 20%, .285/.046  
6.7 M 60%, E 0%, .358/.012 6.9 M 50%, E 0%, .304/.033 
6.10 M 35%, E 0%, ns   
Prediction for Evolutionary Group  6.19 E 20%, M 16%, ns
 
Table 5: Test of hypothesis 1 with data from the indirect section. In this table we expected for all but the 
last answer alternative (6.19) to find a higher level of agreement among molecular biologists. Result cells: 
the numbers behind the characters show percentage of yes answers among the respective group (M, E), the 
following fractions indicate strength (0 – 1) and significance (0 – 1) of association. Results marked ns were 
not significant (>10% or .100). Bold results indicate high significance (< 5% or .050), italic results show 
associations in the reverse direction to that predicted. 
 
4.4. Results for Hypothesis Two 
Hypothesis two predicts that evolutionary biologists will emphasize Gene P and effects 
on the phenotype, whilst developmental biologists emphasize Gene D and contextual 
effects on gene expression. Consequently, we also expected stronger support for the 
informational conception of the gene from evolutionists. 
 
This hypothesis predicts that the developmental group will differ from the evolutionary 
group in a fairly similar way to the molecular group. We therefore predicted a similar 
pattern of responses for these groups on the free-choice task on Section B of the 
questionnaire (see Table 2) as we predicted for the molecular and evolutionary groups 
when assessing hypothesis 1 in the last section. The main difference is the addition of a 
preference for some developmental and contextual notions of the gene (1.6., 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 
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2.7., 5.7) on the part of the developmental group. The predictions and results are given in 
Table 6. 
 
1.3 D50%, E 50%, ns 1.1 E 0%, D 25%, ns
1.6 D 50%, E 20%, ns 2.1v2 E 0%, D63%, .625/.024 
2.3 D 75%, E 100%, ns 4.1 E 40%, D 75%, ns
2.4-7 D 75%, E 40%, .350/.2 7, ns 4.2 E 100%, D 75%, ns 
4.3 D 88%, E 80%, ns 5.4 E 20%, D 0%, ns
4.6 D 38%, E 40%, ns   
5.2v6 D 88%, E 100%, ns   
5.5v9 D 75%, E 60%, ns
 
  
5.7 D 38%, E 0%, .433/.118, ns    
 
Table 6: Test of hypothesis 2 with data from the free choice task. The columns on the left show answer 
alternatives for which a higher level of agreement was predicted for the developmental group (D). The table 
on the right shows our expectations for the evolutionary group (E). Results: the numbers behind the 
characters show percentage of yes answers among the respective group (D, E), the following two fractions 
indicate strength (0 – 1) and significance (0 – 1) of association. ‘Ns’ indicates that the result was not 
significant (>10% or .100). Bold results indicate significance (< 5% or .050), italics highlight outcomes 
reverse from the stated prediction. 
 
The results for the free choice task were not consistent with hypothesis two. Rather than 
favoring the phenotype-focused Gene P conception of the gene, the evolutionary grp 
tended to reject it when it was offered explicitly (Table 6). So the results from Section B, 
in which we asked direct questions, suggest that biologists with an evolutionary focus in 
their research are as exclusively focused on the molecular-l vel properties of the gene as 
biologists with a developmental research focus, if not more so. But, just as with 
hypothesis one, a different picture emerges from the indirect questions in Section C.  
 
In the light of hypothesis two, we predicted that the developmental and evolutionary 
groups would respond differently to several items in Section C of the questionnaire 
(Table 4). As already noted, hypothesis two predicts that the developmental group will 
differ from the evolutionary group in a similar way to the molecular group. We therefore 
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predicted responses for these groups on the forced-c oice task on Section C of the 
questionnaire as we predicted for the molecular and evolutionary groups when assessing 
hypothesis one in the last section. The predictions and results are given in Table 7. 
 
Predicted answers for Developmental group  
6.5 D 33%, E 0%, ns 6.6 D 67%, E 20%, .447/.094, ns 
6.7 D 56%, E 0%, .556/.038 6.9 D 67%, E 0%, .645/.016 
6.10 D 56%, E 0%, .556/.038   
 
Table 7: Test of hypothesis 2 with data from the indirect section. In this table we listed the indirect 
questions (Table 4) for which we expected a higher level of agreement from the developmental group when 
compared to the evolutionary. Result cells: the numbers behind the characters show percentage of yes 
answers among the respective group (D, E), the following fractions indicate strength (0 – 1) and 
significance (0 – 1) of association. Results marked ns were not significant (>10% or .100). Bold results 
indicate high significance (< 5% or .050), italic results show associations in the reverse direction to that 
predicted. 
 
In contrast to the results for the direct questions, and just as we saw with hypothesis one, 
the results for the indirect questions supported hypothesis two (Table 7). The pattern of 
answers to questions 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 shows the evolutionary gr p responding more 
strongly to changes in distal function than the developmental group, although the results 
for the first two questions are above the 5% significance level. The results for 6.9 and 
6.10 show a significant association in the predicted di ction (the corresponding results 
for hypothesis one showed an association in the predicted direction, but did not achieve a 
5% significance level, which is plausibly because the test lacked power). The contrast 
between the results for direct questions (Section B) and indirect questions (Section C) 
leads to repeat our tentative suggestion from the section on hypothesis one: that the 
evolutionary group has an explicit belief that genes are molecular entities and should be 
defined and investigates at that level whilst deploying in their actual thinking a Gene-P 
conception that abstracts away from differences at the molecular level and focuses on 
phenotypic effects.  
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4.5. Results for Hypothesis Three
Hypothesis three predicts that developmental biologists will be les  attracted to Moss’s 
Gene-P and to informational conceptions of the gene than (other) molecular biologists. 
We expected developmental biologists to be more attracted to conceptions that emphasize 
contingency and context dependency, such as Moss’s Gene-D and various 
developmentally-oriented definitions of the gene which we quoted from the literature on 
evolutionary developmental biology. 
 
In the light of this hypothesis we made the following predictions for the free-choice task 
on Section B of the questionnaire (see Table 2): 
· Question 1. The molecular group will be more likely to accept the Gene-P op ion 
(1.1) than the developmental group, who will be more likely to accept the Gene-D 
option (1.6).  
· Question 2. The developmental group will be more ik ly to accept some of the 
more or less radical epigenetic options (2.4 – 2.7). The molecular group will be 
more likely to accept the Gene-P variants 2.1 and 2.2. 
· Question 4. The molecular group will be more likely to accept the Gene-P 
alternative 4.1, while the developmental group will be more likely to accept 4.3 
and 4.6, answers that emphasize the investigation of genes at the molecular level, 
and also 4.4, an option highlighting the idea of developmental modularity. 
· Question 5. Molecular biologists will be more likely to accept the gene-P option 
5.4, while the developmental group should like the Gene-D versio  given by 5.5. 
Results are shown in Table 8. 
 
The results were broadly supportive of the hypothesis. Alternatives 1.6 and 5.5, which we 
saw as embodying the Gene-D conception, discriminated strongly between the two 
groups, with the association for 5.5 being significant at the 5% level. Question 5.5 could 
also be regarded as testing for interest in the context sensitivity of gene expression. 
Alternatives 1.1 and 2.1, which we saw as embodying the Gene-P conception, also 
discriminated strongly between the two groups, and the latter association was significant 
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at the 5% level. The stronger preference for the Gene-D conc ptualization in the 
molecular group is particularly striking, since according to hypotheses one and two both 
these groups should show some tendency to prefer a Gene-D to -P 
conceptualization, at least as compared to the evolutionary group. 
 
1.6 D 50%, M 21%, ns 1.1 M 43%, D 14%, ns  
2.4-7 D 60%, M 53%, ns 2.1 M 41%, D 0%, .353/.041 
4.3 D 88%, M 75%, ns 2.2 M 72%, E 60%, ns
4.4v6 D 60%, M 55%, ns 4.1 M 73%, D 60%, ns
5.5 D 40%, M 13%, .282/.048  
 
5.4 M 20%, D 0%, ns  
 
Table 8: Test of hypothesis 3 with data from the free choice task. Left-hand column shows answer 
alternatives for which we predicted agreement by the developmental group (D), right-hand column those 
for which we predicted agreement by the molecular group (M). Result cells: the numbers behind the 
characters show percentage of yes answers among the respective group (D, M), the following fractions 
indicate strength (from 0 to 1) and significance (0 – 1) of association. Results marked ns were not 
significant (>10% or .100). Bold results indicate high significance (< 5% or .050), italic results show 
associations in the reverse direction to that predicted. 
 
We used the results on the forced choice task for the same five questions from Section B 
as a further test of hypothesis three. The purpose of the forced choice task was to reveal 
differences hidden by the free choice task, in which minimally acceptable options may 
not be distinguished from highly preferred options. Just as with the free choice task we 
predicted the answers that we expected from each group for each question. Because this 
was a forced choice task in which each subject close only one option, where more than 
one answer option seemed equally likely to be preferred by a particular group, we coded 
a strong disjunction of these answers as a single answer. Table 9 shows the result of our 
grouping and recoding exercise for the forced choice answers according to hypothesis 
three. 
 
As expected, the forced choice task discriminates more strongly between the two groups 
under scrutiny. Only Question 4 did not discriminate, the rest showing strong  
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(from 0.430 to 0.630) and highly significance (1%) association.  
 
Predictions for Developmental Group  Predictions for Molecular Group 
1.3, 1.4, 1.6  1.1, 1.5  
2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8  2.1, 2.2, 2.3 
4.3, 4.4, 4.6  4.1 
5.5, 5.7, 5.9  5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.6 
 
Table 9: Grouped force-choice prediction for Hypothesis 3. The answer alternatives in each cell were 
combined by strong disjunction on the grounds of their expected appeal to one group. 
 
In their responses to Question 1, the molecular group showed a preference for the Gene-P 
and informational gene options (1.1 v 1.5), while the developmental group was 
distributed between the classical molecular gene options and the Gene-D option (1.3 v 
1.4 v1.6). Results are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Results for Hypothesis 3 for the forced ch ice task on Section B, Question 1. Association 0.430, 
significance 0.011. 
 
In response to Question 2, the molecular group preferred Gene-P conceptions and the 
classical molecular conception (2.1 v 2.2 v 2.3), whereas more than half of the 
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developmental group voted for one of the developmental or epigenetic alternatives (2.4 v 
2.6 v 2.7 v 2.8), Results are shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Results for Hypothesis 3 for the forced choice task on Section B, Question 2. Association 0.460, 
significance 0.006. 
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Figure 5: Results for Hypothesis 3 for the forced choice task on Section B, Question 5. Association 0.630, 
significance 0.000 
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For Question Five we predicted that the developmental group would be more likely to 
choose the alternatives that emphasize the role of g nes in a larger developmental context 
(5.5 v 5.7 v 5.9), while the molecular group would be more likely to choose Gene-P and 
informational conceptions or alternatives reflecting the classical molecular conception 
(5.3 v 5.2 v 5.4 v 5.6). This pattern was in fact observed (Figure 5), and closer 
examination revealed that none of molecular group chose any of the developmental 
alternatives. 
 
The indirect questions in Section C of the questionnaire (see Table 4) provided another 
test of hypothesis three. W  did not expect as great a difference between the molecular 
and developmental groups as between either of these and the evolutionary group. 
Nevertheless, since hypothesis three attributes to the molecular group a tendency to be 
more focused on the intrinsic similarity between DNA sequences themselves and less 
focused on similarities or differences in context, we expected the molecular group to be 
more likely to accept as two copies of one gene the pairs of sequences described in 
questions 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7., questions that introduce differences at progressively more 
distant stages of gene expression. Questions 6.18 and 6.20 also tested for whether 
sequence similarity would overwhelm other considerations. For question 6.19, however, 
although we had elsewhere pr dicted that molecular and developmental groups would be 
less attracted to Gene-P conceptions that evolutionary biologists, we predicted that the 
developmental group would be most unlikely to accept a judgment based on this 
conception, since it abstract  away from precisely the issues on which their research is 
focused. We therefore predicted that they would be less likely to accept the case 
described in 6.19 than the molecular group. The associations we actually observed for 
these various questions were all in the directions predicted, but only two of them were 
significant (Table 10). 
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Answer Prediction for Molecular Group 
6.5 M 66%, D 27%, .319/ .021 6.18 M 20%, D 0%, ns 
6.6 M 69%, D 54%, ns 6.19 M 16%, D 0%, ns 
6.7 M 61%, D 46%, ns 6.20 M 46%, D 10%, .313/ .024 
 
Table 10: Test of hypothesis 3 with data from the indirect section. In this table we listed the indirect 
questions (Table 4) for which we expected a higher level of agreement from the molecular biologists when 
compared to the developmental group. Result cells: the numbers behind the characters show p r ent ge of
yes answers among the respective group (M, D), the following fractions indicate strength (0 – 1) and 
significance (0 – 1) of association. Results marked ns were not significant (>10% or .100). Bold results 
indicate high significance (< 5% or .050), italic results show associations in the reverse direction to that 
predicted. 
 
5. Conclusions and Prospects for Future Research 
The results reported here provide tentative support for our three hypotheses. Hypothesis 
three seems most strongly supported. Biologists whose research focus is in 
developmental biology seem to conceptualize genes in a distinctive way, a way that 
appears to reflect their use of the gene concept to investigate the complex, developmental 
pathways through which genes are express d. Hypotheses one and two, which suggest, in 
broad terms, that biologists whose research focus is in evolutionary biology conceptualize 
genes primarily via their effects on phenotypes, are supported in some tests but not 
others. The fact that the hypotheses ar  supported when indirect questions are used, but 
not when direct questions are used, leads us to advance an intriguing further hypothesis. 
We propose that these biologists may have an explicit belief that genes are molecular 
entities and should be defined and investigated at that level, whilst deploying in their 
actual thinking about genetic problems a conception of the gene that abstracts away from 
differences at the molecular level and focuses on phenotypic effects. We hope to test this 
hypothesis in future research. 
 
Our general results for the whole subject population are consistent with Fogle’s 
suggestion that the classical molecular gene concept continues to function as something 
like a stereotype for biologists, despite the many cases in which that conception does not 
give a principled answer to the question of whether a particular sequence is a gene (Fogle 
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2001). Given the extensive psychological literature on this kind of cognitive structure and 
on the reasoning processes it support , this also suggests productive lines of future 
inquiry. 
 
Given the small number of subjects in this study and the simple criteria used to group 
them for statistical analysis, we are very encouraged by the ability of the study to discern 
differences between the groups. In ongoing research in the United States we are 
attempting to increase the number of subjects by an order of magnitude, and to use more 
sensitive measures to define our groups, including the techniques subjects utilized in their 
research, their individual ranking of journals and their attendance at professional 
meetings.  
 
Our results clearly indicate the importance of distinguishing between explicit and implicit 
ideas about the gene. In our ongoing research we ask subjects to engage in tasks such as 
dividing a limited research budget between a number of proposed research projects or 
indicating their confidence that a result will extrapolate from one model system to 
another. These tasks have the added advantage of providing numerical ratherthan 
categorical date, allowing a wider range of statistical procedures to be employed. 
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i In a recent essay, one of us has argued, contra Rheinberger, that his insights are consistent with the view 
that scientific concepts stand in a referential relationship to states of affairs outside the discourses in which 
they are employed  (Griffiths 2002). 
ii References to different ‘gene concepts’ (e.g. evolutionary, Mendelian, classical molecular) have the same 
problematic status as the ubiquitous references to different ‘species concepts’ in biology. As far as possible 
we will write, instead, of various different ‘conceptions’ of the gene, to avoid vexed issues about ‘counting 
concepts’ along axes of conceptual difference in time, or, as here, between fields.  
iii A fully annotated version of the questionnaire indicating these sources is available in the documents 
linked to this paper on the Philosophy of Science Association preprint server (http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu). 
iv These definitions are available in the documents linked to this paper on the Philosophy of Science 
Association preprint server. (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu). 
